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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Confidence in the so-called command-and-control model of envi-
ronmental policy has eroded substantially over the past decade under 
the belief that prescriptive regulation, while effective at addressing 
the low-hanging fruit of environmental policy concerns, will be ineffi-
cient and inept in dealing with the complex challenges that lie ahead, 
such as climate change, invasive species, and endangered species.1 
Under the banners of “reinvention,” “regulatory innovation,” and 
“next generation” regulation, many new regulatory instruments have 
been proposed, tested, and by now widely used to adjust and, in some 
cases, supplant the blunt edge of environmental regulation.2  Most of 
these new tools fall into one of three categories: market-based in-
struments that influence behavior through economic incentives; in-
formation-based instruments that influence behavior by improving 
the quantity, quality, and accessibility of information; and contract-
based models that afford regulatory authorities and regulated parties 
room to negotiate context-specific standards and conditions.3 Al-
though environmental law remains dominated by prescriptive regu- 
 
                                                                                                                     
 * Matthews & Hawkins Professor of Property, Florida State University College of 
Law, Tallahassee, Florida. Adam Schwartz provided valuable research assistance, and the 
Florida State University College of Law sustained my research through financial and other 
support. All errors and other deficiencies in this final product are nonetheless solely my re-
sponsibility, thus please direct all comments or questions to jruhl@law.fsu.edu. 
 1. By the mid-1990s, “virtually everyone . . . agree[d] that our historical command-
and-control approach [wa]s inefficient and inadequate by itself to carry us to where we still 
need to go.” Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Foreword: The Search for Regulatory Alternatives, 
15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J., at viii, viii (1996). 
 2. See Dennis D. Hirsch, Symposium Introduction: Second Generation Policy and the 
New Economy, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (2001). 
 3. Law professors Richard B. Stewart of New York University and Dennis D. Hirsch 
of Capital University have charted this evolution of environmental law. See Dennis D. 
Hirsch, Lean and Green? Environmental Law and Policy and the Flexible Production Econ-
omy, 79 INDIANA L.J. 611 (2004); Hirsch, supra note 2; Richard B. Stewart, Administrative 
Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (2003); Richard B. Stewart, A New 
Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21 (2001). 
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lations, it is fair to say that most new fronts of environmental regula-
tion are focused, first and foremost, on exploring how the new set of 
tools can be employed. 
 In his contribution to this Symposium, Professor Bradley Kark-
kainen measures examples of these emerging instruments of envi-
ronmental regulation under the theoretical framework of “penalty 
defaults.”4 As he explains, penalty default theory focuses on the na-
ture of private contract law as a source of “gap-filling” rules for in-
terpreting incompletely specified contracts.5 These rules act as harsh 
default positions for the parties unless they deliberately contract to 
reach specific terms to supplant the default outcomes. In this sense, 
the default positions are penalties designed to encourage parties to 
opt out of the default by bargaining in the open on important issues, 
thus facilitating greater information symmetry between the parties.6 
 It is insightful of Professor Karkkainen to transport this theoreti-
cal model from the law of contracts to the dynamic world of environ-
mental law. He does so in order to examine the mechanisms by which 
the emerging set of regulatory innovation instruments may similarly 
produce information-forcing incentives, leading to greater parity of 
information between regulators and the regulated. To me, the most 
compelling analogue between private contract and public regulation 
in this respect is the case of the contract-based instruments. Since 
penalty default theory arose in the context of private contracts, it 
makes sense to consider its utility in understanding the effects of 
greater reliance on the “contractarian” model of regulatory innova-
tion. Indeed, as Professor Karkkainen suggests, the fit seems good: 
the penalty default in the public law context is the harsh regulatory 
prescription; the penalty nature of the default encourages the regu-
lated party to access the contact-based program to achieve a more 
equitable regulatory burden; and to engage in the negotiation, the 
regulator and regulated parties must divulge information to each 
other.7 The result, as in private contracting, is greater information 
parity between the parties. 
 There is one hitch, however, though it is not one that reveals a flaw 
in Professor Karkkainen’s project by any means but rather demon-
strates the value of his exercise. It has to do with the simple fact that 
only the parties to a private contract have direct participation rights in 
the negotiation. The potentially many other persons with an interest 
in the outcome of the private contract negotiations have no third-party 
participation rights. In environmental law, by contrast, we conven-
                                                                                                                     
 4. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 861 (2006).  
 5. Id. at 868. 
 6. Id. at 869-70. 
 7. Id. 
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tionally have treated the public as having just as much interest in 
regulatory outcomes as the regulators and the regulated and, thus, 
have long afforded interested third parties some degree of participa-
tory rights in environmental decisionmaking.8 This makes all the dif-
ference in terms of how we evaluate the effects of using contract-based 
instruments as the penalty default opt-out mechanism. 
II.   THE RISE OF OPT-OUTS 
 In private contract default rules, the two parties control the out-
come. Except in the case where no negotiated or default rule resolu-
tion exists, the decision to negotiate or not does not change the basic 
dynamics of the issue resolution process as a two-party, arms-length 
negotiation. Although third parties may have an interest in the out-
come of the contract negotiations, their participatory role, if any, is 
not altered by the contracting parties’ decision to opt out. 
 In the regulatory setting, the default rule is the prescribed regula-
tory outcome, with negotiated “contractarian” processes being offered 
as alternatives serving various policy objectives such as flexibility, ef-
ficiency, and innovation. However, unlike private contract negotia-
tions, the decision by the regulator and regulated parties whether to 
negotiate or not does change the basic dynamics of the issue resolu-
tion process. The conventional permitting process, using default 
regulatory rules for substantive outcomes, carries with it a set of de-
fault regulatory procedures that afford participation rights for inter-
est groups. By contrast, the contractarian opt-out alternatives gener-
ally diminish the participation rights of third-party interest groups 
and thus increase control of the regulator-regulated two-party dy-
namic over the substantive outcome.   
 With this departure from the default procedures, the opt-out be-
comes a bit of a slippery slope toward shutting out public participa-
tion. In the setting of an applicant for an agency permit, for example, 
the applicant seeks substantive flexibility, procedural efficiency, and 
in general, a process closer to the more familiar territory of private 
contract negotiations. Thus, relaxing the procedures—that is keeping 
the transaction costs of the opt-out lower than those of the default 
regulatory position—is an essential requirement for fulfilling the 
success of the contractarian objective of promoting flexible, efficient, 
innovative, and substantive outcomes. Indeed, this may become such 
an attraction to applicants that they flock to the opt-out mechanism 
in droves.  
                                                                                                                     
 8. See Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Delib-
erative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173 (1997); Mark Seidenfeld, Empower-
ing Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 411 (2000).  
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 But what about the third parties interested in the outcome? Inter-
est groups fearing diminished participation rights in contract-based 
frameworks are likely to pressure the agency to duplicate those rights 
in the contractarian setting. If they are not duplicated, the agency may 
face relentless citizen suit litigation over procedural and substantive 
claims or appeals to other means of challenging the contractarian out-
come through exercise of what Professor Karkkainen refers to aptly as 
their “destabilization rights.”9 And, in general, some agencies may, for 
a variety of policy reasons, wish to ensure liberal public participation. 
But yielding to this pressure by imposing procedural requirements in 
the contractarian setting similar to the default procedures of conven-
tional permitting is likely to impose transaction costs that deter appli-
cants from using the contractarian approaches.  
 The result, therefore, may be that agencies wishing to experiment 
with contract-based instruments find themselves in a pickle. The 
success of the contract-based approach depends in large part not only 
on its substantive advantage for regulated parties, but also its proce-
dural advantage. But the procedural advantage for the regulated 
party often equates to a procedural disadvantage for interest groups 
wishing to influence the outcome. Because public law recognizes that 
third parties bear an interest in regulatory outcomes greater than 
that provided in private contract settings, the agency cannot ignore 
the interest groups’ dissatisfaction with the new contractarian proce-
dures. Adjusting to their demands, however, makes the contract-
based approach less attractive as an opt-out from the penalty default 
rule for the regulated parties. In the end, the agency is likely to make 
all sides unhappy, so why bother experimenting with contract-based 
approaches in the first place? 
III.   THE RESPONSE OF SHUT-OUTS 
 To give some meat to the bones of this concern, I offer the Endan-
gered Species Act (ESA)10 example of the Habitat Conservation Plan 
(HCP) program.11 Section 9 of the ESA generally prohibits any act 
                                                                                                                     
 9. Karkkainen, supra note 4, at 893-97. 
 10. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000). This Article is not 
intended to provide a comprehensive overview of the ESA. For comprehensive treatments of 
the ESA, several of which are referred to infra, see MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. 
ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW (3d ed. 1997); ENDANGERED SPECIES 
ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES (Donald C. Baur & Wm. Robert Irvin eds., 2002) [here-
inafter LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES]; LAWRENCE R. LIEBESMAN & RAFE PETERSEN, 
ENDANGERED SPECIES DESKBOOK (2003); STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SOCIETY, THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (2001); TONY A. SULLINS, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (2001). 
 11. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1). This Article also is not intended to provide a comprehen-
sive overview of the ESA’s HCP program. For a more complete description of the mechan-
ics of the HCP program, see J.B. Ruhl, How to Kill Endangered Species, Legally: The Nuts 
and Bolts of Endangered Species Act “HCP” Permits for Real Estate Development, 5 ENVTL. 
L. 345 (1999). 
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that would injure or kill an animal that is of a species designated as 
in danger of extinction by the federal government.12 The U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service (FWS), which administers the ESA for terres-
trial and freshwater species, has interpreted section 9 to extend to 
any habitat modification that leads to actual death or injury of an 
endangered species.13 The effect of that interpretation is that many 
land development projects around the nation would violate section 9, 
except that section 10 of the ESA provides authority for FWS to issue 
permits for “incidental take” of protected species—that is, take which 
is incidental to an otherwise lawful activity.14 To obtain such a per-
mit, an applicant prepares a “conservation plan,” which has come to 
be known as a habitat conservation plan (and thus HCP), demon-
strating compliance with a variety of criteria.15 
 The HCP program was a late bloomer, having been added to the 
ESA in 1982,16 but used only infrequently until the mid-1990s.17 Dur-
ing the 1990s, Bruce Babbitt, then-Secretary of the Interior with re-
sponsibility for implementing the ESA through the FWS, seized on 
the HCP program as a means of quieting unrest in Congress over the 
“pit bull” qualities of the ESA’s regulatory force. The history and pre-
cise details of how Babbitt transformed the HCP program need not 
                                                                                                                     
 12. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(C). For a description of the cases developing the legal 
standards for what constitutes “take,” see Gina Guy, Take Prohibitions and Section 9, in 
LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 10, at 191; LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra 
note 10, at 39-46; Steven P. Quarles & Thomas R. Lundquist, When Do Land Use Activities 
“Take” Listed Wildlife Under ESA Section 9 and the “Harm” Regulation?, in LAW, POLICY, 
AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 10, at 207; STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SOCIETY, supra 
note 10, at 104-12; SULLINS, supra note 10, at 44-54; Alan M. Glen & Craig M. Douglas, 
Taking Species: Difficult Questions of Proximity and Degree, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 
65 (2001). For a description of the process for identifying, or “listing,” species as endan-
gered or threatened, see LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 10, at 15-20; J.B. Ruhl, Sec-
tion 4 of the ESA: The Keystone of Species Protection Law, in LAW, POLICY, AND 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 10, at 19; STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SOCIETY, supra note 
10, at 38-58; SULLINS, supra note 10, at 11-25. 
 13. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2004). 
 14. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B). 
 15. See id. § 1339(a)(2)(A). 
 16. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1411 
(1982). 
 17. By 1992, for example, the FWS had issued only twelve HCP permits, whereas it had 
issued approximately 225 by October 1, 1997. LAURA C. HOOD, DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, 
FRAYED SAFETY NETS: CONSERVATION PLANNING UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT, at 
vi-xiii (1998), available at http://www.defenders.org/pubs/hcp02.html. For background on 
these developments and the HCP program in general, see Shi-Ling Hsu, The Potential and 
the Pitfalls of Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL. 
L. REP. 10,592 (1999); Albert C. Lin, Participants’ Experiences with Habitat Conservation 
Plans and Suggestions for Streamlining the Process, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 369 (1996); Barton H. 
Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings & Incentives, 49 STAN. 
L. REV. 305 (1997); Robert D. Thornton, Habitat Conservation Plans: Frayed Safety Nets or 
Creative Partnerships?, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 94 (2001); Eric Fisher, Comment, Habi-
tat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act: No Surprises & the Quest for 
Certainty, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 371 (1996). 
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be repeated here.18 What matters is that HCPs became exactly what 
Professor Karkkainen suggests generally of regulatory innovation in-
struments—a contract-based opt-out mechanism for landowners to 
avoid the penalty default of the section 9 take prohibition. As I have 
previously described the program: 
 The features of HCP permitting . . . establish the regulatory pa-
rameters within which the process unfolds. But those parameters 
leave much of the details of the HCP to the HCP development 
phase, in which negotiation between applicant and agency shapes 
the final HCP design. For good reason, however, neither the ESA, 
the agencies’ regulations, nor the HCP Handbook contains “reci-
pes” for determining what is really at the heart of the HCP per-
mit―the quality and quantity of take that will result and the miti-
gation required in return. Given the particularities of species, their 
habitats, and the impacts of a project on each in particular loca-
tions, defining take and mitigation becomes a project-specific topic 
of negotiation. . . . In the end, the context within which an HCP is 
sought resembles a structured negotiation in which many issues 
are open for negotiation, but the overall process is encompassed in 
a regulatory “box” that cannot be ignored or violated.19 
 Many practitioners and academics have examined and applauded 
the HCP program innovation as the poster child of contract-based re-
form.20 Indeed, based on the success of the HCP program, Babbitt’s  
Department of the Interior adopted the Candidate Conservation 
Agreement mechanism to provide incentives to landowners to con-
serve habitat of candidate species21 and developed the Safe Harbor 
mechanism to provide incentives to promote the introduction of habi-
tat of species already listed.22 Yet, in every case, interest groups have 
objected to the procedural flexibility inherent in negotiated processes 
and their diminished role therein compared to conventional permit-
                                                                                                                     
 18. For a more thorough account of the political factors that set the stage, see John D. 
Leshy, The Babbitt Legacy at the Department of the Interior: A Preliminary View, 31 
ENVTL. L. 199, 208-12 (2001).  
 19. Ruhl, supra note 11, at 391, 376-77. 
 20. See Daniel A. Farber, A Tale of Two Cases, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 33, 44 (2001); Hsu, 
supra note 17, at 10,594-600; Jean O. Melious & Robert D. Thornton, Contractual Ecosys-
tem Management Under the Endangered Species Act: Can Federal Agencies Make Enforce-
able Commitments?, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 489, 493 (1999).  
 21. See Announcement of Final Policy for Candidate Conservation Agreements with 
Assurances, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,726, 32,727 (June 17, 1999) (illustrating how Candidate Con-
servation Agreements allow a landowner to take conservation steps on behalf of species 
that are candidates for listing in return for an assurance that, if the species is later listed, 
the landowner has in place the necessary incidental take authorization to allow continua-
tion of land uses covered under the agreement).  
 22. See Announcement of Final Safe Harbor Policy, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,717, 32,718 (June 
17, 1999) (showing how Safe Harbor agreements allow a landowner to foster conditions 
suitable for listed species for determined periods of time in return for an assurance that 
later development will be allowed on the property to a level that returns the species to its 
“baseline” conditions existing on the property at the time of the agreement).   
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ting models, and the agency has responded by adding procedural 
burdens to the contractarian opt-out.  
 Consider, for example, the following complaint from an environ-
mental advocacy interest group based on its evaluation of a group of 
HCPs: 
Citizens from various stakeholder groups have no formal role in 
the HCP process except through the public comment period and, 
for some plans, through the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) or requirements of state or local law. Often, by the time 
public meetings occur or official drafts are released for comment, 
however, both the regulated interests and the services have in-
vested so much money and time in plan development that they are 
unlikely to change course. . . . [C]itizens (including those repre-
senting the environmental community) generally have not had a 
seat at the negotiating table in many major recent negotiations de-
spite the fact that conservationists (in addition to FWS) represent 
the public’s interest in protecting endangered species. . . . 
 For the vast majority of plans . . . public participation was not 
adequate, given the plans’ large effects on public resources. The 
most glaring examples are large-scale, single-landowner plans that 
significantly affect public resources . . . . While those plans did 
have public meetings and/or formal comment periods, the conser-
vation strategies resulted from private negotiations with largely 
token attempts at listening to the public’s concerns. In addition, 
numerous small-scale HCPs reviewed here involved exclusive ne-
gotiations between the landowner and FWS . . . . This lack of pub-
lic participation has resulted from an absence of formal require-
ments to involve the public and the limited leverage of citizens 
who do not have a direct financial stake in negotiations.23 
 As predicted, the agency responded to such pressure by loading up 
the contractarian mechanisms with conventional regulatory review 
and analysis steps that diminish its procedural efficiency. Consider 
the following evaluation of the Safe Harbor and Candidate Conserva-
tion programs by a leading environmental advocacy interest group 
representative:   
Despite . . . impressive initial indications, it is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that the record of accomplishment with these new con-
servation tools may be no more inspiring than the record with the 
old tools unless a number of self-imposed obstacles to success are 
removed. Those obstacles . . . are self-imposed because they do not 
inhere in the law itself, but are instead the product of an unimagi-
native, process-preoccupied, and ultimately self-defeating imple-
                                                                                                                     
 23. HOOD, supra note 17, at 43-44; see also Holly Doremus, Preserving Citizen Participa-
tion in the Era of Reinvention: The Endangered Species Act Example, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707 
(1999), available at http://www.defenders.org/pubs/hcp10.html (examining the growing ten-
sion between the HCP and other ESA reform programs and public participation values). 
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mentation that discourages and deters opportunities for tangible, 
on-the-ground improvement. These debilitating constraints have 
no partisan or ideological provenance. . . . 
 Successful conservation efforts between landowners and the 
government are built on a foundation of trust. That foundation is 
eroded by the all-too-frequent practice, after the terms of a Safe 
Harbor or Candidate Conservation Agreement are worked out be-
tween a landowner and the Service field office, of asking the land-
owner to agree to changes recommended by the regional office or 
by the recovery coordinator for the species covered by the agree-
ment. Such changes have been recommended both before an 
agreement is put out for public comment, and afterwards. Multiple 
and successive layers of Service review may be appropriate in 
other contexts, but they are poison in the context of voluntary un-
dertakings by landowners to implement beneficial management 
actions for rare species. It is hard for a landowner to avoid the con-
clusion that the Service is less interested in getting something use-
ful done on the ground than in getting a second and third bite at 
the apple in its dealings with the landowner. 
 Remedying this problem is entirely within the ability of the 
Service. The field office biologist negotiating a Safe Harbor Agree-
ment ought to have the responsibility to solicit the views of the re-
gional office and of the recovery coordinator before concluding a 
draft agreement with a landowner. Public comments received 
thereafter might identify other desirable changes, but they should 
not be regarded by the Service as a license to reopen the entire 
agreement.24 
 To be sure, these are isolated evaluations of a set of related regu-
latory programs, albeit one of the most prominent with respect to 
contract-based regulatory innovation. But they do suggest that atten-
tion must be paid to the procedural impact of regulatory penalty de-
fault rules and their opt-out mechanisms. Professor Karkkainen has 
done an excellent job of overlaying the penalty default model on envi-
ronmental regulation innovation and revealing its information-
forcing potential. At the same time, that overlay exercise also pin-
points what is different about the penalty default model in its home 
private contract context versus in its alien regulatory law context—
the procedural entitlements of third parties.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 My sense, then, is that one of the most difficult challenges for 
regulatory innovation in general, if it is to yield the promised eco-
                                                                                                                     
 24. Michael J. Bean, Challenges to Making Second Generation Approaches Work, 11 
A.B.A SEC. ENV’T ENERGY RES. 1, 2, 7 (Oct. 8-12, 2003) (proceedings of the ABA’s Section of 
Environment, Energy, and Resources’ 11th Section Fall Meeting). 
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nomic and information efficiencies, will be managing the fallout that 
builds as interest groups find the penalty default rule opt-outs leave 
them participatory shut-outs. The penalty default rule model, as Pro-
fessor Karkkainen demonstrates, not only reveals why contract-
based innovations in regulatory instruments may improve informa-
tion parity between regulator and regulated parties but why they 
might also reduce information parity between the principal parties to 
the negotiated regulatory outcome and third-party interest groups. I 
have suggested there is evidence of likely resistance to any such 
trend, which is not surprising given the long-followed conventions of 
public participation under command-and-control models of environ-
mental regulation. But the innovation instruments simply will not 
work if the solution takes the quick-fix approach of grafting first-
generation command-and-control procedures onto the second-
generation regulatory innovation tools. The work ahead for regula-
tory innovation, therefore, is in finding new means for keeping pro-
cedural rights, such as public participation, meaningfully intact 
while still tapping into the desired benefits of innovation. 
